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Rumors, statements, meetings and apprehension have descended upon the Korean Peninsula after North Korean leader Kim Jong Il failed to appear at a large celebration marking the 60th anniversary of North Korea on Sept. 9. Though Kim previously has skipped major public events, he typically has attended his country’s anniversaries in five-year increments, including the 50th and 55th anniversaries in 1998 and 2003, respectively. His failure to show up this time lends credence to U.S. intelligence reports that Kim might have recently suffered a stroke, and subsequent media reports that he remains conscious but partially paralyzed.
The reports have caused a frantic reaction in South Korea. An emergency Cabinet meeting was called Sept. 10, followed by Defense Ministry claims that no change has been detected in the North’s military affairs and the subsequent raising of the South Korean Unification Ministry alert status to high. More broadly, Kim’s potential demise (or at the very least his inability to remain at the regime’s helm) has caused jitters around the globe.
North Korea without Kim
Given that Kim is already in his 60s and in poor health, the possibility that North Korea might soon lose the personality around which all its internal workings revolve is very real. Rather than a review of the ins and outs of how and if the “Dear Leader” has been incapacitated, a deeper look at what the Korean Peninsula could look like without Kim is in order.
North Korea after Kim could trend toward one of two scenarios: a fairly stable transition (in North Korean style), or instability. To understand the former, it is necessary to look at North Korea’s internal power structure.
North Korea is governed by a group of elites managed and balanced by Kim. Although disagreements about allocation of resources and patronage occur from time to time, North Korean elites are unified in their desire to preserve and perpetuate their hold on power and the privileges that come with it.
The current regime’s survival will depend first and foremost on how well the various elites play together in shaping a successor government, how well they can balance their competing interests and whether they open themselves up to external exploitation. (By the third point, we mean allowing neighboring powers like China to direct North Korean politics from behind the scenes.) These internal factors will either push the regime toward a swift and sure demise, or they will cause it to re-emerge strengthened.
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